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101 wood Street
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4 July 1980

Mr David Newsom
U.S. Department of State
2201 C Street NW
Washington, D.C. 20000

Dear Mr Newsom,

A friend of mine, Gilchrist Olympio, the Togolese opposition leader, will be in Washington from July 15th and has expressed an interest in meeting with you at that time.

I enclose a packet of materials on Togo and Olympio. He will be in the U.S. to meet with journalists and political people about the current precarious strategic state of West Africa, a part of the world that he feels the United States is not taking seriously enough.

I hope you will have the time to receive him, and look forward to your answer.

Sincerely yours,

Paul R. Michaud

Paul R. Michaud
On leave, Harvard University

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WASHINGTON MERRY-GO-ROUND Monday, July 7, 1980

From UNITED Feature Syndicate

By Jack Anderson

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WASHINGTON -- Almost a decade ago, I introduced Idi Amin, the mad ruler of Uganda, to a world that had taken little notice of him. He strutted for a while on the world stage until his ignominous fall from power last year.

Now his place as the world's most asinine despot has been taken by a flamboyant man with the unpronouncable name of Etienne Gnassingbe Eyadema. He rules the 2.4 million people of the small West African nation of Togo with a flair which, if set to music, would make comic opera.

He is square-shouldered and close-cropped, his massive bulk too big for his stature, with a deep, resonant voice such as one expects to hear call sinners to the Last Judgment. His talk is rambling and his temper short, suggesting an exasperation over the inability of others to see those simple truths that are so clear to him.

Although he is less bloodyhanded than Idi Amin, Eyadema's attempt to portray himself as a living god indicates that he is cut from the same cloth. Here are some examples of his reach for divinity:

. Portraits of the 44-year-old president-for-life, wearing the wings of an angel, are displayed in government and private offices throughout Togo.

. Eyadema buttons showing the dictator's smiling face are worn like boutonnieres on lapels throughout the country.

. . Eyadema not only makes most of the news in Togo; he also reports it. He is the Walter Cronkite of Togolese television, reading the evening news himself.

AUTHENTICATED

. A shrine has been erected at the site of a plane crash from which Eyadema escaped unharmed while four others perished. The wreckage of the

plane has been enshrined, and the date of the crash has been declared a national holiday.

. A $250,000 vanity-press comic book, recounting Eyadema's miraculous survival of the plane crash, starts out in fairy-tale fashion..."Once upon a time there was Eyadema...."

. The erstwhile army sergeant uses such titles as "guide of the nation," the helmsman," "leader of the new march" and "source of knowledge."

The reality of Eyadema's rule is less saintly, however, than his propaganda would suggest. With a handful of other noncommissioned officers in the French-trained Togolese army, he seized power from President Sylvanus Olympio in 1963.

In the past, Eyadema has boasted that he personally killed Olympio, but he denied this in a recent interview. The murdered president's son, Gilchrist Olympio, now a businessman living in Paris, has been trying to oust Eyadema from power.

Gilchrist Olympio told my reporters Bob Sherman and Katherine Koch: "Eyadema has rounded up entire families, even entire tribes, and held them incommunicado from the outside world. One tribe was picked up and held in the desert last year and about 200 people died."

When my reporters telephoned the palace for comment, the tyrant of Togo handled the call himself. He responded in resonant French, gracious to begin, then increasingly bellicose. He denied all charges, finally cutting off the conversation with an abrupt: "I have no time to talk about this nonsense."

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eyadema

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Jimmy Carter has picked a curious target for admiration in Africa: Etienne Gnassingbe Eyadema, the comic-opera dictator of Togo.

I have nominated Eyadema as the world's most asinine despot, citing his weird attempt to make himself a living god by such measures as papering Togo with portraits of himself wearing angel wings, and making a shrine of the airplane wreckage from which he miraculously escaped and a national holiday of the plane crash date.

But there is a darker side to Eyadema's egomania. Though not as demonstrably bloodyhanded as Idi Amin, Eyadema's repressive rule has aroused condemnation from international human rights groups.

Yet last year, President Carter dashed off a brief note to the Togolese tyrant, praising him for pardoning two prisoners condemned to death for an assassination attempt. Carter wrote that Eyadema had shown "the concern for the fundamental rights of life and justice common to our two nations."

The similar values shared by the United States and Togo, Carter wrote, would be the basis for continued friendship.

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Carter's rosy view of Eyadema's regime is not shared by the State Department. In a human rights report earlier this year, the department noted that Eyadema has detained people without trial and without fixed sentences, and concluded that "some cases of unauthorized torture have probably occurred."

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Amnesty International has also cited Eyadema for human rights abuses.

Most damning of all was the assessment of Togo made by Freedom House, a New York-based human rights ~~group~~ watchdog. On a scale of 1 to 7, from most free to least free, Togo got a 7 rating ~~as~~ where "there is extensive ~~a nation~~ political imprisonment or a recent history of imprisonment; executions or other political murders and brutality may be common; unlimited detention, with or without trial, for political views is accepted." Even the Soviet Union was given a 6 rating by Freedom House.

Yet Jimmy Carter sees Togo under Eyadema as a country that shares American values. Needless to say, Eyadema offered the Carter letter as proof of his benign rule.

Footnote: An administration spokesman told my associate Bob Sherman that Carter's letter was intended as a gesture that would encourage Eyadema to liberalize his regime.

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REGISTERED

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P R E S S R E L E A S E

GILCHRIST OLYMPIO, 44, is spokesman for the Mouvement Togolais pour la Democratie (MTD), the Togolese opposition movement.

He was educated at the London School of Economics and Oxford University where he was awarded a doctorate in economics. He was formerly an official of the International Monetary Fund, and is presently a businessman with interests in Benin, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Nigeria and Senegal. A specialist in agricultural development, Olympio has opened an office in Houston, Texas, to promote more cooperation between the United States and Africa in the development of African agriculture.

Olympio's father was Sylvanus Olympio, Togo's first president who, in 1963, was assassinated by that country's current president, Eyadema. Gilchrist Olympio himself has twice been sentenced to death, in absentia, by Togolese courts, and three times been subject to assassination attempts by Eyadema-financed mercenaries.

Gilchrist Olympio has come to the United States to meet with such government officials as Assistant Secretary of State Patricia Derian, Senators George McGovern and Stephen Solarz, and the editors of such publications as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal, to express his concern over American misperceptions of the human rights situation in West Africa, and generally of American Africa policy that seems to underestimate the strategic importance to the United States of this mineral-rich part of the world.

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SUNDAY, JUNE 8, 1980 THE NEW YORK TIMES

Critic Says Togo's Leader Has Bankrupted Nation

By BERNARD D. NOSSITER
Special to The New York Times

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., June 7 — For a man with two death sentences on his head, Gilchrist Olympio displays the cool confidence of the successful businessman he has become since he fled Togo.

Mr. Olympio, who is 43 years old, divides his time jetting between profitable deals in London, Paris and Houston and inveighing against Togo's undisputed ruler, Gen. Gnassingbe Eyadema.

Mr. Olympio, who now lives in Abidjan, the capital of the Ivory Coast, is here trying to gain sympathy for his cause at the State Department and among Togo's creditors, and to do business from Texas to Colorado.

In an interview here yesterday, Mr. Olympio, his trim 6-foot-1-inch frame draped in a gray suit, charged that his tiny West African country had been transformed by President Eyadema into a bankrupt fantasy.

A Comparison With Idi Amin

"We are being held captive by another Idi Amin," Mr. Olympio alleged. "A little less flamboyant, a little less well known, those are the only differences. He rules by fiat. He has bankrupted the country. He has got himself immensely rich and indulges in the most basic violation of human rights — arbitrary arrest, political assassination, collective punishment. Whole villages are put in concentration camps because one villager took a pot shot at him."

Togolese officials at the United Nations were unavailable for comment on Mr. Olympio's charges.

Apart from the death sentences imposed after he went into exile, Mr. Olympio has a personal reason to lead the propaganda movement aimed at bringing down President Eyadema. The general has boasted that he fired the shots in 1963 that killed Mr. Olympio's father, Sylvanus, Togo's first President.

Mr. Olympio runs an engineering company that develops plantations in Africa and is also the spokesman for the Movement for Togolese Democracy. He claims a substantial following for the movement among intellectuals, the better-educated army officers and supporters of his father. But he readily acknowledges that it has made no effort to organize armed resistance in the bush.

"Our people are frightened by fear of French intervention," he said. The Togolese have a healthy respect for troops from Paris who have helped support rulers in Gabon, Zaire and other French-speaking African nations.

Togo, a sliver on the underside of West Africa's shoulder, once existed comfortably on cocoa, coffee, phosphate and smuggling.

New Projects Proliferate

Until 1974, Mr. Olympio says, President Eyadema lived an austere life, but a sharp rise in phosphate prices awakened his appetite. According to Mr. Olympio, Togo and its 2.2 million people soon found themselves the possessors of a $100 million steel mill that produces no steel; four hotels, one 44 stories high, that draw no tourists; a $100 million oil refinery that refines no oil, and an airport in the bush near Pya, President Eyadema's home village, that can receive 707's and DC-10's.

Mr. Olympio contends that the bigger the project the larger the commission taken by the President and his cronies. The normal fee is 10 to 15 percent, Mr. Olympio asserts, but some contracts have yielded as much as 40 percent. With his new-found prosperity, General Eyadema has bought two townhouses in Paris, a chateau in the Bordeaux region and a splendid presidential palace outside the capital of Lomé, according to Mr. Olympio.

Togo's leader, he says, has bought a dozen jet fighters to frighten unruly villagers and patrol boats to guard the 30 miles of coast. The President, Mr. Olympio asserts, has also ordered children and civil servants to spend two hours daily dancing and chanting his praises, calling him among other things "the source of new knowledge and technology." General Eyadema also introduces the nightly news on television, pictured with angel's wings sprouting from his shoulders.

Mr. Olympio charges that the President has imported North Korean "political advisers" to refine torture in his jails and to build a monstrous convention hall and a statue of himself. All this, Mr. Olympio says, has increased the foreign debt to $1.2 billion, or 10 times earnings from exports.

20/11/1979

Key to 12-Year Dictatorship

Togo Leader's Personality Cult Pervasive

By Stephen Powell

LOME, Togo, Nov. 19 (Reuters) — In the office of Togo's minister of information there is a picture of the president, Gen. Gnassingbe Eyadema. Standard practice, of course.

But what strikes the visitor is that the president is wearing the wings of an angel.

Seldom is the personality of a head of state so forcefully projected as in this small West African country.

Many Togolese wear small lapel badges bearing a portrait of the 44-year-old, boyish-looking president. Billboards all over the capital extol the president: "Thank you Eyadema for the year of the peasant" and "Agriculture, the biggest worry of our guide."

In Togo's one daily newspaper, Togo-Presse, Gen. Eyadema is habitually referred to as either the well-loved guide, the national helmsman or the father of the nation.

Great Survivor

The Togolese leader is one of the great survivors in the difficult world of African politics.

In January, 1963, he led the first military coup in independent black Africa and overthrew President Sylvanus Olympio. He assumed power in 1967 in a second coup against Olympio's successor, President Nicolas Grunitsky. Following the takeover, he dissolved Parliament, abolished the constitution and has ruled by decree ever since.

But there are hints that change might come soon to Lome. Military government, once the norm in this part of the world, has recently been going out of style. In both Nigeria and Ghana the military have handed over power to civilian governments.

Even in Marxist Benin (formerly Dahomey) on Togo's eastern border, the military government has organized a general election that is scheduled for tomorrow. It will be the first in the country's history.

Gen. Eyadema announced in August that it was necessary for the government to emerge from its exceptional situation.

A special congress of Togo's only political party, the Togolese People's Rally, is due to be held from Nov. 27 to 29. This is expected to discuss a wide range of proposals, being drawn up by six commissions.

There is speculation here that the government might decide to hold a referendum on a constitution and then arrange an election.

Togo's national assembly, a white-washed building near Lome's sandy beach, has a rather forlorn and neglected air. Parliamentary archives are stacked in piles on the floor, and the paint is peeling of the walls. The building does house some offices, including the Eyadema Foundation, a government-run political institute.

The government argues that it has given the country stability and the country's economy is certainly in a better state than those of Ghana and Benin.

But government overspending in Togo on projects like luxury hotels has brought financial problems.

The external debt has climbed rapidly in the last two years and it is now in the region of $1 billion, a formidable sum for a country of 2.5 million people. The country's problems have been compounded by falling prices for phosphates, its main export.

Power in Togo is firmly in the hands of the Northerners. Gen. Eyadema is from the North and so are most of the army officers.

According to some Southern Togolese, who feel excluded from the machinery of government, their situtation has worsened in recent years. Many have simply left the country.

Inside Togo there is no open criticism of Gen. Eyadema. In Europe, human rights organizations have accused the Togolese government of imprisoning, kidnapping or trying to murder political opponents.

Last month, a son of the assassinated President Sylvanus Olympio was the target of an unsuccessful bomb attack in Paris.

Gilchrist Olympio charged Gen. Eyadema with trying to murder him, but the Togolese government denied this.

A Western diplomat in Lome said: "It was fortunate for Togo that you had Idi Amin in Uganda, Bokassa in the Central African Empire and Francisco Macias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea. Now that this layer has been scraped off there could well be more scrutiny of the government here."

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against unfair dismissal of a (white) employee due to "inequitable changes in conditions of employment". These measures have the effect of giving the average white worker such protection that the Nationalist Party was able to proclaim in the same by-election statement mentioned earlier that "the position of the White worker, among others, will be protected more efficiently, [since] statutory job reservation protected only one out of every 200 white workers".

Armed with their power of veto, the white unions are likely to insist that Africans will be admitted to the 'white' categories of work only on condition that they are hired if there is no white available to do the job, and when there is any reduction of the workforce, that they be 'first fired'. This kind of arrangement would leave the labour market just where it has always been under apartheid legislation, argue the critics: a labour market that has never formally blocked the advancement of the black worker, but has done so when that advancement threatens the position of the white worker.

How might all this affect overseas investment? For a long time, business opinion in the West has argued for "constructive engagement". This is basically the idea that the promotion of full economic growth in the country will place such a strain on the traditional institutions of apartheid that it will crumble. The most recent exponent of this argument is **Ali Mazrui**, professor of political science at Michigan University. In the BBC's influential Reith lectures given in November he argued that investment in South Africa should be promoted because it would fuel revolution due to the inherent incompatibility of apartheid and economic growth.

However, the controversy generated by these recent reforms in labour relations has opened up the possibility that the South African government is searching for (and may well find) a new and more efficient way of protecting dominant white labour interests than the old structures of apartheid could have ever provided. It would be a new framework that would accommodate as much economic growth as the West chooses to provide.

Where does this leave the dissident trade unions? The FOSATU, led by **Alec Erwin** with a claimed membership of around 15,000, will be increasingly vulnerable, as other black unions begin to apply for registration. If the government can also manage to persuade international trade union opinion that racial discrimination is being dropped from its labour relations, then it will also be able to cut FOSATU off from the strong overseas support it has so far enjoyed●

AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL, 28 NOV 1979

Togo: Anxious Eyadema

The introduction of a constitution and the eventual re-opening of the national assembly are among the reforms we understand General **Gnassingbe Eyadema** will—as we go to press—be setting before the extraordinary congress of Togo's sole ruling party, *le Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais* (RPT). By calling the party's current third congress (November 27-29) two years ahead of schedule, Eyadema has revealed that he too is aware of the recent build-up of political tension which has been noticeable since the 'mercenaries' affair' of 1977 came to a head in a political show trial in August (see *Africa Confidential* Vol 20 No 5).

Since the abolition of the national assembly by the organisers of the 1967 coup against Nicolas Grunitzky, who was Togo's second president, there has been no national legislature, either appointed or elected. Though the council of ministers meets regularly and plays an important role, all legislative and executive power devolves on Eyadema, who for more than twelve years has issued all laws in the form of decrees. The last two party congresses took place in 1971 and 1976.

A personality cult similar to that surrounding President **Mobutu** in **Zaire**, on whose methods it was originally modelled, has been elaborately built around the president, who is variously described as the 'Guide of the Nation', 'Helmsman' and the 'Father of the New Togo'. Like Mobutu, he is projected as a national saviour—the man who rescued Togo from the post-independence chaos into which it was plunged during the weak regimes of Sylvanus Olympio (1960-1963) and Grunitzky (1963-1967). Giant portraits of the president decorate Lomé street corners and it is advisable for RPT members to wear the obligatory Eyadema badges.

In past years, Eyadema has demonstrated remarkable manipulative skill in bolstering his popularity often as a 'blind' in times of internal discord. On three occasions he has used the gimmick of suddenly threatening to resign and send his soldiers back to their barracks to hand over to civilian rule. The last was in November, 1976, when his threat provoked a 200,000 strong 'spontaneous' demonstration in the streets of Lomé to plead with *le Guide* to stay in office. He backed down four days later. There are indications that another 'back to barracks' call is imminent. The old ritual will recur.

Several developments over the past twelve months are responsible for Eyadema's reforming stance. As we have previously reported (see *Africa Confidential* Vol 20 Nos 1 and 5), Togo's national economy has been sliding into serious deficit, largely as a result of over-investment in infrastructural projects based on the miscalculation that the 1974 boom in phosphate prices would be long-lasting. Other contributory factors have been tacitly acknowledged by the 44-year-old president in a series of corrective measures. His government's total debt has risen from $648m in 1975 to a figure currently estimated at between $900m and $1bn.

day trial in August before the State Security Court in Lomé's *Palais de Justice*.

Before the trial, the president met the journalists and gave them a detailed account of the three-year-old plot, producing the trial's main exhibit, a pile of rusted machine guns and rifles dredged from a lagoon in Lomé. He also gave out the taped confessions of **David Tomkins**, a British explosives expert, who turned queen's evidence on his fellow mercenaries and travelled under safe conduct to Togo to 'tell all he knew". Tomkins said he could identify two sons—**Gilchrist** and **Bonito**—of Sylvanus Olympio, Togo's former head of state, as his paymasters for whom "money was no object" and named **Tom Finan**, an ex-Canadian army colonel, as the commando organiser.

At the trial, the seven defendants were represented by three respected Togolese lawyers whose submissions were neither impressive nor token. Two of the four judges accompanying the president of the court on the bench, were forced to stand down because of incriminating statements they had made in the press concerning the defendants. At the end of the hearing, the judges took five hours to reach their verdict. They sentenced two to death, three to imprisonment for ten, eight and five years and made two acquittals. The death sentences were stayed until August 30, when at a public rally in Kpalime in western Togo, Eyadema reprieved the two condemned men, **Emmanuel de Souza** and **Kouao Sanvee**.

If this act of mercy was intended to appease his foreign critics, it was unsuccessful in the case of the *Amnesty International* observer. Durste left Togo disquietened by his observations. If, as Eyadema has stated, there is no longer an ethnic problem in Togo, the fact remains that members of the Olympio and de Souza families have been specifically designated "foreigners" and their passports have been revoked, thus prohibiting them from leaving Togo. It remains to be seen if Eyadema, a Kabre from northern Togo, feels the time has come to stop persecuting certain factions within Lomé's so-called Brazilian elite, on the strength of a dismally unsuccessful series of coup attempts.

Togo is often seen in a north-south power context because Eyadema, the Kabre northerner, wrested power from two southern-based predecessors. In addition, most of the country's wealth lies in the south. But Kabre domination in the army has also aroused resentment among other smaller northern ethnic groups. **Fousseni Mama**, an old party warhorse from the Grunitzky government, has been brought back to prominence in the RPT to placate non-Kabre northerners. Another Moslem and an important figure in the hierarchy is **Ouattara Nachaba**, director of the president's cabinet. He recently travelled to Europe, allegedly in connection with a counter-plot against the organisers of the 1977 mercenary attack.

This bears out reports that Eyadema is still obsessively anxious to catch all those defendants tried *in absentia* in August. Last month, **Beni Lawson**, who was condemned to death *in absentia*, arrived in Togo by air from Niger. The Togo government denied reliable reports that he had been kidnapped in Niamey and forcibly taken to Lomé.

Uganda: The wrestling continues

Despite the enlargement a couple of months ago of the Ugandan National Consultative Council (NCC) into a lively 127-member debating body, there is little sign of the emergence of any stabilising consensus. Indeed, the factionalism in the country may well have increased. It is as difficult as ever to categorise the disparate groups that now seem to comprise the current powers-that-be. Here are their broad outlines:

1. The most striking recent development is the growing determination of President **Godfrey Lukongwe Binaisa** to show that he is not the "stop gap" leader that some predicted he would be, after the demise of his predecessor, Prof. **Yusufu Lule**. Binaisa has been trying to assert his strength over the kingmakers within the NCC. Particularly audacious was the sacking on November 19 of Defence Minister **Yoweri Museveni**, who had clearly been staking a claim to be the country's behind-the-scenes strongman (see *Africa Confidential* Vol 20 No 20). Museveni was relegated to the inconsequential ministry for regional co-operation. A leading pro-Obote leftwinger, **Aticker Ejalu**, was also demoted from the regional co-operation portfolio to the Ugandan embassy in France. (At first, Japan was said to be his destination.).

As we go to press, it is by no means certain that Museveni will take his rebuff lying down. Some NCC members are already accusing Binaisa of using the 'dictatorial methods' that, they argue, cost Lule his job. Binaisa was recently hard pressed to ensure the ratification by the NCC of his relation **Roger Mukasa** as chairman of the Uganda Development Corporation. Another friend, **Bukombe Mpambara**, was curtly rejected as chairman of the Uganda Coffee Marketing Board by the NCC.

Nor has the enlargement of the NCC from 30 to 127 necessarily facilitated the wielding of presidential power by Binaisa, for the manner of the council's enlargement was largely controlled by the old NCC itself, whose membership was by no means eager to increase Binaisa's power. The 61 'representative' new council members were chosen by 'district councillors' from a short list of 728 candidates. But the NCC had first carefully pruned the list from a total of over 1,200 Ugandans who had put themselves forward. Another 10 members of the NCC are army representatives, few if any of them greatly beholden to Binaisa. The method of their selection has not been divulged. The final 26 extra members are the government ministers and

Des choix douteux

PAR SAMÉ NGOSSO

L'agriculture délaissée, des milliards engloutis dans les dépenses de prestige ou des projets mal étudiés, un endettement record : rien ne va plus à Lomé.

Le 30 novembre prochain, le Togo entend célébrer avec éclat le 10e anniversaire de la création du parti unique, le Rassemblement du peuple togolais (R.P.T.). A cette occasion, le chef de l'Etat, le général Gnassingbé Eyadema, annoncera très certainement, dans son discours à la nation, les grandes décisions qui, du 27 au 29 novembre, auront été adoptées par le congrès extraordinaire. En particulier, celle de doter le pays, douze ans après l'accession au pouvoir d'Eyadema, d'une Constitution à un moment où le Togo est cité à propos des atteintes aux droits de l'homme. Cette mesure est jugée urgente par les autorités qui espèrent ainsi désarmer bon nombre de critiques.

C'est que, longtemps ressassé, l'argument du « développement » à promouvoir ne suffit plus à justifier l'attentisme du régime. Les résultats sur le plan économique tranchent en effet les proclamations officielles d'satisfaction.

La rencontre qui rassembla à Paris, au mois de juin dernier, les principaux créanciers (le « Club de Paris ») de l'Etat togolais illustre bien les difficultés de ce pays. Au cours de cette réunion, à laquelle assistaient également des représentants du Fonds monétaire international et de plusieurs banques occidentales, les participants ont examiné la possibilité d'accorder un moratoire pour le remboursement de la dette extérieure, qui s'élève à plus de 1,2 milliard de dollars. Cet endettement apparaît particulièrement lourd si l'on songe que les recettes budgétaires du Togo sont inférieures à 200 millions de dollars et que, en 1977-1978, les recettes d'exportation atteignaient à peine 120 millions de dollars.

Jusqu'à ces quatre dernières années, il est vrai, plusieurs circonstances exceptionnelles ont abusé les observateurs sur la situation économique du Togo. L'exode massif des commerçants ibos durant la guerre du Biafra, l'arrivée, en 1970, des Indiens et Libanais venus du Ghana donnèrent en effet l'impression d'une activité commerciale très active. D'autre part, à la même période, le recours au port de Lomé comme une des solutions à la congestion chronique du port de Lagos renforça cette tendance factice.

Le Togo passa donc pour un îlot de prospérité. Or, dans le même temps, les rapports publiés par la Banque centrale et l'O.P.A.T. (Office des produits agricoles du Togo) diagnostiquaient une situation économique catastrophique. Ils faisaient ressortir un état de stagnation du secteur agricole par rapport à 1960, dans un pays où l'agriculture représente 70 % du P.I.B., et dénonçaient une industrialisation mal conçue et peu rentable.

La Banque centrale pour sa part, avait lancé un cri d'alarme à propos des cultures vivrières, largement insuffisantes pour nourrir une population en croissance rapide. Ainsi, la production d'ignames, aliment de base, stagne autour de 400 000 tonnes par an, le maïs à 116 000 tonnes, après une légère augmentation en 1975. La production de manioc qui, en 1976, retrouvait juste son niveau de 1958 (449 000 tonnes), a fortement décliné en 1977, et les estimations font état de 200 000 tonnes pour 1979. A telle enseigne que, pour alimenter l'usine de traitement de manioc de Gauave, qui ne tourne qu'à 50 % de sa capacité, on envisage sérieusement de recourir à l'importation.

En ce qui concerne les produits agricoles d'exportation, la régression est tout aussi patente, à l'exception du cacao. De 10 000 tonnes en 1960-1961, la production du café est tombée à 6 200 en 1976 et plafonne aujourd'hui à 9 000. La production de coton est en chute libre : de 7 000 tonnes par an en moyenne au début des années 1970, elle est tombée, pour la récolte 1977-1978, à 1 300 tonnes. Quant à la production cacaoyère, les chiffres, légèrement en hausse, donnés à Lomé sont accueillis avec prudence dans les organisations spécialisées. Le rapport du Ghana Cacao Marketing Board estime, par exemple, que 30 % au moins de l'exportation cacaoyère du Togo seraient d'origine ghanéenne, du fait de la contrebande. Celle-ci, on le sait, est alimentée par les désordres monétaires au Ghana et les faibles prix à la production qui y sont pratiqués. Le Togo n'aurait donc produit, en réalité, que 12 000 tonnes (ce qui correspond à la production de 1960), au lieu des 18 000 tonnes annoncées.

Les raisons avancées par les autorités pour expliquer ces médiocres résultats — mauvaises conditions climatiques et difficultés d'approvisionnement en semences — résistent mal à l'examen ou en tout cas n'expliquent pas tout. En effet, la Banque centrale, dans le rapport cité, indique que 2 % seulement des crédits à moyen et à court terme sont alloués à ce secteur crucial. Pour ne citer qu'un exemple : en 1975, sur les 15,1 milliards de francs CFA de crédits à court terme consacrés à l'économie, 414 millions seulement allaient à l'agriculture. La stagnation de la production a eu, entre autres conséquences, celle de faire monter les prix des produits vivriers : 20 % par an en moyenne.



Des panneaux qui chantent à tous les carrefours
La population, elle, déchante

La raffinerie
Plus de brut depuis un an

Le marasme du secteur agricole n'a pas manqué, bien entendu, de se répercuter cruellement sur les finances publiques, d'autant que le phosphate, autre source de devises du Togo, voyait ses cours fluctuer. Les recettes budgétaires globales étaient de 16 milliards de francs CFA en 1972. La prodigieuse flambée des prix du phosphate, dont le Togo est producteur, à partir de 1974, devait apporter de substantielles rentrées à l'Etat. Mais, dès 1976, le vent tournait, et les recouvrements (en 1976) étaient, selon la Banque centrale, de 35,1 milliards au lieu des 50 milliards de francs CFA prévus, soit un taux de réalisation de 70 %. Le problème s'est d'ailleurs aggravé en 1978 et en 1979, obligeant le Togo à recourir à un second tirage auprès du F.M.I.

Par ailleurs, ces difficultés ont amené Lomé à recourir à un financement « monétaire » auprès de la Banque centrale pour combler son déficit budgétaire. A tel point que le plafond statutaire pour ce type de financement, fixé à 20 % des recettes de l'année précédente, a été largement dépassé, au grand désarroi des autres pays participant à l'Union monétaire ouest-africaine (U.M.O.A.). Tous les comptes créditeurs, aussi bien ceux des correspondants du Trésor que ceux des collectivités locales et des entreprises para-étatiques, ont également été ponctionnés.

La mauvaise situation des finances de l'Etat provient en partie, au dire même du président togolais, des choix industriels et d'investissements, ces derniers ayant été réalisés, non pas sur la base de critères de rentabilité, mais plutôt en fonction des commissions qu'il rapportaient aux dignitaires du régime. C'est le cas notamment de l'achat de 600 tracteurs « Ebro », qui pourrissent encore aujourd'hui à Togblekopé, et dont la commande était ignorée du ministre de l'Agriculture lui-même. C'est aussi le cas d'un investissement de 15 milliards de francs CFA pour la construction d'un aéroport de classe internationale, en pleine brousse, à Niamtougou, à plus de 500 km de Lomé.

A l'exception des projets inter-Etats, comme par exemple la Cimao (1), plusieurs unités de production, notamment dans le secteur industriel, sont d'un intérêt économique douteux. La plupart n'arrivent pas à dégager un *cash flow* suffisant pour faire face aux remboursements des emprunts. Il s'agit, entre autres, de la raffinerie et de la scierie de Lomé, des grands hôtels de luxe récemment ouverts. La majeure partie de ces projets a été financée grâce à des prêts extérieurs, à des conditions souvent peu avantageuses, et par le biais d'hommes d'affaires étrangers peu scrupuleux.

La construction d'une série d'hôtels — le « Sarakawa », le « 2-Février » (tour de 30 étages), le « 30-Août » (qui ne fonctionne qu'à l'occasion des anniversaires du R.P.T.), la « Paix », etc. — représente un endettement global de plus de 55 milliards de francs CFA. Or, depuis l'inauguration de l'« Hôtel de la Paix », en 1976, le taux de remplissage au Togo oscille entre 30 et 40 % l'an. Qu'en sera-t-il dès l'année prochaine, une fois les deux hôtels « Sarakawa » et « 2-Février » terminés ?

La situation de la raffinerie de pétrole de Lomé, dont la réalisation fut confiée à la société d'ingénierie « Humph-O Glasgow », est tout aussi révélatrice. D'une capacité de un million de tonnes, alors que la consommation intérieure ne dépasse guère le cinquième, cette unité ne tourne pas depuis un an, faute à laquelle la Nigeria a arrêté tout approvisionnement en brut. Lagos se plaint, en effet, d'une facture impayée de 5 milliards de francs CFA. Or cette raffinerie a coûté à l'Etat togolais plus de 2[illegible] milliards de francs CFA, financés par la banque Hill-Samuel.

Il en va de même de la sidérurgie dans la mesure où le Togo ne dispose pas des matières premières nécessaires et encore moins de débouchés pour les produits finis.

Un profond malaise

Dans le tertiaire, en particulier dans les sociétés d'Etat telles l'O.P.A.T., la Sonacom ou Togopharma, des distorsions identiques sont observables. Dans le cas de l'O.P.A.T., les ponctions régulières effectuées sur ses recettes lui laissent à peine de quoi remplir sa mission.

Quant à la Sonacom, qui a le monopole des importations, elle est ni plus ni moins qu'un instrument de « racket » aux mains de quelques personnalités puissantes du régime, qui, en accord avec M. Assor, homme d'affaires marocain et conseiller économique du Togo, ont confié au bureau de ce dernier, installé à Paris, l'exclusivité sur toutes les transactions d'achat à l'étranger. Les prix exorbitants pratiqués par cette entreprise poussent de nombreux Togolais à s'approvisionner au Bénin.

Les mesures proposées par le F.M.I. et le « Club de Paris », et apparemment acceptées par les autorités togolaises, pourront-elles mettre fin à cette gabegie? L'application de mesures sévères restrictives de même que la restructuration des secteurs productifs relèvent avant tout d'une ferme volonté. Or, le malaise politique et social a atteint un seuil critique au Togo et on voit mal comment le gouvernement pourrait demander au peuple de se serrer un peu plus la ceinture sans, du même coup, signer son arrêt de mort. Cette situation pourrait se révéler sans issue, pour un régime de plus en plus décrié, à l'intérieur comme à l'étranger.

S. N.

(1) « Comptoir de l'Afrique de l'Ouest », qui regroupe le Togo, le Ghana et la Côte d'Ivoire dans l'exploitation des gisements de Togan

L'économiste du tiers monde 11/1979

A. ARTHEL:
IMMIGRES DANS LEUR PROPRE PAYS

TOGO:
LA FACE CACHEE D'EYADEMA

S.N

Eyadema has brought what he and his supporters would no doubt claim to be political stability to his country. He rules by decree and claims that on three occasions when his government had broached the subject of restoring civilian rule, the people had asked him to stay by "spontaneous" demonstrations.

transit stop for many West Africans who flock to buy relatively cheap goods.

Such a situation makes for corruption and Eyadema was not slow to point this out in a speech last year. He said: "The whole administration has become so corrupt that it has fallen into anarchy and in the choice of investments profitability has ceased to matter; all that matters is

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was a foregone conclusion. Four death sentences, eight of which were on those abroad, three prison sentences of between 10 and five years and two acquittals were the verdict of Togo's State Security Court "against those who wanted to hinder our revolution."

Then came Eyadema's trump card. On August 30 he was addressing a rally to mark the 10th anniversary of his Togolese People's Party

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By a correspondent in Lomé

"mercenary affair" was last week within the trial

ident the following day t
or the opening of the trial.
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the plot was first discover
were regaled with the offici
facts, and were shown a
ana's press conference a
and ammunition c
into the country for th
rding to the official sto
ana was warned by Britai
the American Embassy in
October 13, 1977 of an imminen
by mercenaries on his life,
planned for two days later. The
said arms for the operation were alre
the country. Another message the following
day reinforced the seriousness of the story
since it came from a different source, and
Eyadema called together all his service
heads asking them to confess if they knew
thing about the plot. None of them did,
organised a special deployment of
night and the next day. When the
aries who were coming from Ghana
normal security at the fronti
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ent Eyadema's regime, ho
left with the task of finding
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who promptly fled after
his house. The major bro
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naries set out, misbehaviour
port led to their arrest and
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which reached Ghana, made



where
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arrest in June
he had
been "sick" at the
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Ghana, and that this had
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interrogations during which
been
"*un peu trop bousculé*", a discreet way of
describing maltreatment and torture. This
principal accused, and in effect prosecution
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Germain de Souza, his cousin
Souza, and of Sanvi de Tove
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and all this little
dabbling in some
Eyadema's regime.

To cut a long and
— complicated by th
Government's merc
detail over the
Emmanuel de Souza
persuaded to say certa
more coherent conspir
Gilchrist and Bonito Olympio
involvement with mercenaries
were certainly mercenaries, Ghana
certainly played a changing part, and
President Eyadema's regime had to
manoeuvre during the last two years to put

public
centrality in Togolais

THE GUARDIAN Tu
21-8-79

T... tria... follo... plot

African coup... been a bit pas... Dogs of War, so... retrograde air i... week, when Gene... faced the foreign ... desk groaning ... machineguns—dredg... the lagoon—which ... main exhibit in t... treason trial.

The alleged ringle... the two sons of Sylvan... pio, Togo's first presid... was killed in 1963. Th... be tried in absentia.

President Eyadema is ... aggrieved: first by the ... itself which would surely ... succeeded if two British ... cenaries had not attra... attention by getting dr... lowing the British Gov... ent to give Lomé the tip... ... Amnesty International ... ...sing him of overdoing th... ...coup repression.

"Once we had blown up the ...sident and captured the ...unition dump, we had a ... ...er cent chance of suc... ...one of the British mer... ... said, with the cool ... ... of the trade. He ... ...r last year on a safe ... tell the story.

"... were other profes... ...uls. After the first ... ... been "blown," the ... ... Canadian colonel ... someone else at ... Air Services base ... "This man said ...

Schwarz: ...om ...go

... because he ... busy just ...ntion. But ... another ... out of ... thing ...nough. ...an un... tour... each ... final ... each man in a 13-man team would have got more than 10 times that amount.

President Eyadema handed the press a tape recording of the mercenaries evidence. In it he is heard recalling that one possible killing ground was "a secluded house — badly ... — the President used ... night for making ... they chose to ...rain under ...eral.

... but that ... a ...ng a ...

... ...

'LE MATIN' - 15 octobre 1979

Togo : mercenaires pour assassiner des personnalités de l'opposition

Les fils de l'ancien président Olympio, tué en 1963, affirment que l'actuel chef de l'Etat togolais a recruté des hommes de main pour les abattre

On croyait achevée la vendetta politique qui, depuis quinze ans, oppose le régime togolais du président Eyadema à la famille Olympio, dont le père, ancien président du Togo, avait été assassiné en 1963. Il n'en est pourtant rien : Gilchrist Olympio affirme aujourd'hui que le chef de l'Etat togolais a recruté des mercenaires pour l'assassiner, ainsi que son frère Bonito et un ancien officier de l'armée togolaise, le colonel Merlaud Lawson. Gilchrist Olympio appuie cette grave accusation sur les confidences qui lui ont été faites par l'un des mercenaires chargés de l'assassiner.

S'AGIT-IL simplement du troisième acte — rocambolesque — d'une mauvaise pièce ou d'une conspiration véritable, d'autant plus grave que c'est un Etat souverain, le Togo, qui cette fois recrute pour son propre compte une équipe de mercenaires et de tueurs à gages ? Mais, comme dans *le Retournement*, de Vladimir Volkoff (Julliard), les mercenaires — contre une poignée de livres sterling — ont changé de bord. Et sont passés aux aveux.

Ces professionnels, il est vrai, paraissent être des spécialistes du double jeu.

Premier acte : en février 1976, quatre mercenaires — un Canadien et trois Britanniques — se rendent au Togo pour mettre au point un plan visant à assassiner le chef de l'Etat togolais, le général Gnassingbe Eyadema. Le coup est prévu pour le mois de juillet 1976. Mais il n'aura jamais lieu : alerté par les services secrets britanniques, le général Eyadema déjoue le complot. Il retourne l'un des mercenaires, David Tomkins, qui livre les dessous de la conspiration.

Deuxième acte : le 25 août 1978, Tomkins, devant les ambassadeurs en poste à Lomé, fait une « confession publique » pendant trois heures. Il affirme avoir été contacté pour assassiner le président Eyadema et renverser le régime, par Gilchrist et Bonito Olympio, fils de l'ancien président Olympio assassiné lors du coup d'Etat de 1963. Tomkins livre les noms d'une douzaine de complices locaux qui seront jugés en août 1979. La Cour de sûreté de l'Etat du Togo prononcera dix condamnations à mort, dont huit par contumace (notamment Gilchrist et Bonito Olympio). Les deux condamnés qui devaient être exécutés ont été graciés par le président Eyadema, le 30 août dernier.

Troisième acte enfin, révélé au *Matin* par Gilchrist Olympio : il y a un mois l'Etat togolais s'adresse à ces mêmes mercenaires pour assassiner trois des principaux dirigeants de l'opposition togolaise en exil : Gilchrist et Bonito Olympio, et le colonel Merlaud Lawson.

L'un des mercenaires est un Britannique, David Davidson, métis d'origine indienne. Ancien parachutiste, David Davidson, cinquante ans, est aujourd'hui à la retraite, il possède une ferme à une vingtaine de kilomètres d'Hereford, base du Special Air Service (unité de commandos parachutistes). Le 14 septembre, Davidson téléphone de Londres à Gilchrist Olympio, qui se trouve alors à Paris, pour lui dire en substance que le président Eyadema a envoyé dans la capitale britannique son « *chef de sécurité* » qui a négocié avec le chef du groupe des mercenaires, David Tomkins, son assassinat ainsi que celui de son frère Bonito, et du colonel Lawson.

Selon Gilchrist Olympio, le chef de la sécurité mentionné n'est autre que le propre frère du président Eyadema, responsable des berets verts togolais, avec le grade de lieutenant. David Tomkins, avec lequel il a traité — et auquel il a promis 50 000 livres sterling (500 000 FF) — est un ancien para de l'armée britannique, expert en explosifs, qui, pendant la guerre d'Angola, avait recruté des combattants pour le FNLA de Holden Roberto.

Un tatouage sur le bras gauche

Selon les confidences qu'il a faites à Gilchrist Olympio dès ce 14 septembre, Davidson s'est rendu à Paris, en compagnie de Tomkins, les 11, 12 et 13 septembre, pour « *reconnaître les lieux* ». Les deux hommes, dont les frais sont payés par l'ambassade du Togo à Londres, logent à l'hôtel Mercedes de l'avenue de Wagram. « *Dans la nuit du 11 au 12 septembre*, dit aujourd'hui Gilchrist Olympio, *des choses bizarres se sont passées devant mon domicile du boulevard de Courcelles. Ma concierge, Mme Colleuille, m'a averti qu'elle avait vu deux hommes, dans une voiture immatriculée en Grande-Bretagne, prendre des photos. Mon neveu, Etienne de Souza, étudiant en architecture qui vit chez moi, a également vu les deux hommes, un grand et un plus petit, ce dernier ayant un tatouage sur le bras gauche.* »

Après le coup de téléphone de Davidson, le « mettant au parfum », le 14 septembre, Gilchrist charge son frère Bonito, qui se trouvait alors à Londres, de contacter Davidson. Les deux hommes se voient au pub *Aladin*, à proximité du métro de South Kensington. Davidson explique alors pourquoi il joue le double jeu : « *C'est trop dangereux. On n'assassine pas des gens à Londres ou à Paris avec autant de facilité qu'on peut le faire en Afrique. Je suis prêt à laisser tomber. Je vous livre les renseignements.* »

Gilchrist et Bonito passent alors un marché avec le mercenaire, lui donnent une « récompense » (quelques milliers de livres sterling) et lui demandent en échange de faire une confession écrite devant un avocat d'affaires assermenté. Il s'agit de A.H. Chubb, aujourd'hui en possession du témoignage de David Davidson *(dont nous publions un extrait ci-contre)*.

Quelques jours plus tard, David Tomkins, qui, lui, ignore que son équipier joue le double jeu, rencontre l'ambassadeur du Togo à Londres, Ajavon Matthias, et le « chef de sécurité », qui lui remettent des photos d'identité des personnes visées. Ils donnent également au mercenaire l'adresse de la maison de campagne de Gilchrist Olympio en France. Tomkins accepte l'opération et contacte un ancien légionnaire, Ray Jocquim. A-t-il l'intention, alors, de faire exécuter ce triple assassinat ou au contraire veut-il toucher l'argent qui lui a été promis avant de renoncer ?

Les frères Olympio et le colonel Lawson l'ignorent. Dès le début de l'affaire, ils sont avertis Scotland Yard à Londres et, à Paris, la préfecture de police, auxquels ils demandent protection.

Le complot est aujourd'hui éventé. Pourtant, les trois hommes qui devaient en être les victimes affirment être toujours menacés : selon eux, le directeur de cabinet du président Eyadema, Ouattara Nachaba, l'ambassadeur du Togo à Londres et David Tomkins se sont rencontrés ce dernier week-end à Paris. Ils se demandent s'ils n'ont pas l'intention d'ajouter un quatrième acte à cette pièce sans précédent.

Christian Casteran

Alain Noguès

Le président Gnassingbe Eyadema : « Les tribalistes, ce sont les autres... »

Le Nord contre le Sud

PAR-DELA le règlement de comptes qui oppose le président Eyadema et la famille Olympio — différend qui se règle par mercenaires interposés —, les accusations de l'opposition togolaise en exil contre le régime togolais relèvent d'un conflit politique plus général qui oppose le nord au sud.

« Olympio avait créé une véritable barrière entre nos deux régions, déclarait au Matin, *le 23 août dernier, le président Eyadema (...).* Comme son père, Gilchrist Olympio veut opposer les regions entre elles (...) Le tribalisme, ce n'est pas moi qui le fais, c'est lui. »

La region côtière du Togo (le sud), lieu privilégié de la pénétration étrangère, est la plus développée du pays. C'est de cette région qu'est issue toute l'élite politique et intellectuelle du Togo. Le président Eyadema, lui, est originaire du nord, et il s'efforce de retablir l'équilibre entre le nord et le sud, au détriment donc du sud, jusqu'ici privilégié.

Ce « rééquilibrage » passe par des mesures vexatoires prises à l'encontre de certaines grandes familles du sud — les Olympio, les Lawson ou les De Souza —, considérées par le président Eyadema comme des « étrangers ».

Ce grave conflit ethnique est la toile de fond de la lutte à mort qui s'est engagée, ces derniers mois, entre le president Eyadema et les fils de l'ancien president Olympio.

Ch. C.



Des extraits du fac-similé de la « confession » du mercenaire Davidson, deposée devant un homme de loi britannique :

« *A qui de droit,*

» *Le 1er septembre, alors que je rendais visite à David Tomkins à son domicile, 42 Hor. Sucy, Camberley, celui-ci m'a demandé si j'avais des nouvelles des Olympio. J'ai répondu que je n'avais pas de contact (...) Lorsque je demandai pourquoi il me posait la question, il m'a répondu qu'il voulait savoir si j'étais prêt à tuer les deux frères, Gil et Bonito, ainsi qu'un colonel Lawson (...)*

» *On avait évoqué pour chaque tueur qui prendrait part à un assassinat la somme de 50 000 livres... C'était en raison des risques particuliers pour assassiner quelqu'un à Paris (...) Je pensais qu'il etait parti à Paris, mais je crois davantage qu'il est au Togo pour discuter des paiements.* » Signé : *S. Davidson. fait le 11 octobre 1979, devant Child and Child, Solicitors, Londres.*

K.H.S. Davidson,
[redacted]
Swinedale Estate,
Nenford AR2 7QF.
(Phone 0432-57595)

To Whom It May Concern

(a) On the 1st. Sept. while visiting Dave Tompkins at his home .... 42 Nor. Surry, Camberley .... I was asked if I had heard from the Olympics. I replied that I had not had any contact since the last meeting with Benito when DT had been present.

On enquiring the reason for the question I was asked if I would be prepared to fill both brothers ---Ge " : Benito .... & a Col. Lawson who had flat Togo & was also resident in Paris.

I replied, "why not!" & we began discussing plans.

(b) Two [redacted] were shown to me .... one with an address, 96 Rue de Courcelles .... pencilled on the back. D.T. informed me that he had

been brought there personally by the chief of Presidents Eyadema Security & had been told that the President of Togo had plans to return the country to civil government but was afraid that doing this would inevitably return the Olympios to the circle & he was prepared to pay handsomely for their removal. (a sum of £50,000 per assassin per killing was mentioned) ... This was due to the risk involved as the killings would have to take place in Paris.

There were 2 snaps of Bendo O. which DJ had received earlier from the same source & according to Lui, Le Lad Inactra down his quarry to the home of the Ghana Ambassador and had decided that the risk of killing him in the UK was too great.

(c) I pointed out that the information at hand was unsufficient & that a recce was needed to make sure that the address given was the correct one.

DJ & I flew to Paris on the 11th Sept on expense money he had obtained from the Togo Ambassador in London. DECLASSIFIED

We resided at the MERCEDES Hotel in the Rue de Wagram & conducted a recce from there.

Our first objective was to recce, thoroughly, the 9th R.A.C. & its surrounds.

Secondly we looked in the local Telephone directory & found that the address listed for Gillhurst Olympio was 72 Bde. de Courcelles & the Telephone number was 766 9659.

We recced this address also & the surrounds.

While doing so we were seen by a young man who exited from No 72 & who immediately became suspicious & tried to hide from us. We decided that we had found the right place & returned to UK on the 13th Sept.

The undercover operation DECLASSIFIED Gill & Todd then what was about to happen - Thereafter all information.

I received was passed to the Olympio brothers.

(d) Information passed included:-

(i) On the 18th Sept. David went to Paris to see an ex-Legionaire called Ray Jacquin --- a friend of John Banks.

(ii) On Friday the 28th D.J. visited the Togo Embassy to collect Expences & to meet the Chief Security Officer who had brought some maps of Col. L. & the information that G. Olympio possibly resided at 12 Bds. de C.

(iii) On 6th. Oct. D.J. left home to 'tie up a few details' according to his wife. I presumed he'd gone to Paris again but on reflection, he may be in Togo to discuss payment.

HAROLD STANLEY DAVIDSON

Signed

DECLARED at CHILD & CHILD SOLICITORS. 3 HOTCOMB STREET, LONDON SW1X 8LS this 11TH day of October 1979 Before me

HAROLD STANLEY DAVIDSON

SOLICITOR EMPOWERED TO ADMINISTER OATHS A. H. CHUBB

THE WASHINGTON POST

Dec. 15, 1977

Tipoff in Togo: The Saga of a British Hit Squad

By Bernard D. [illegible]

LONDON, Dec. 14—In the small hours of Oct. 15, a squad of mercenaries made up of former non-coms from Britain's version of the Green Berets took a look at Togo's border with Ghana. They did not like what they saw.

The place was crawling with Togolese soldiers and police, searching every vehicle with unaccustomed vigor. This was clearly not going to be a good day to go in and assassinate Togo's president, Lt. Col. Gnassingbe Eyadema.

So the nine-man hit team returned to the Ghanaian capital of Accra, where it was disbanded. In Britain, a backup squad of 14 more mercenaries was left cooling its heels. President Eyadema not only lived to tell the tale, but to announce to a largely uninterested world that he had been saved by a tipoff from "friendly powers."

Just who hired the mercenaries, and why the procurer wanted President Eyadema killed, remains a mystery to this day. But the last-minute tipoff, it is known, came from the British Foreign Office. The sequence of events strongly suggests, moreover, that there was a conflict—or at least a mix-up in signals—between the Foreign Office and the "dirty tricks" arm of the British Ministry of Defense.

The story, which has emerged from interviews in Whitehall, the seat of British government, and from bits and pieces that have gotten into the press here, runs as follows:

The [illegible] of the murder team was made up of alumni of Britain's Special Air Services. An elite World War II commando outfit, the SAS has carved out a unique role for itself in post-war Britain. Its expert killers have plied their trade in the Persian Gulf and Ulster, and two SAS men advised the West German commando squad that rescued the Lufthansa hostages in Mogadishu.

Since theirs is a specialized trade with few civilian outlets, discharged SAS veterans are a fertile source for mercenary recruiters.

Enter Tom Finan. A British-trained Canadian soldier and former lieutenant colonel in the Canadian tank corps, he paid out at least $200,000 of somebody's good money to arrange the Togo affair. To lead the hit squad, he recruited a former SAS sergeant, David "Darkie" Davidson.

Finan apparently assembled his two hit teams around Hereford, a sleepy British market town that is home for the one active SAS regiment, the 22nd. Ex-Sgt. Davidson lives there and his wife is a civilian worker for the regiment.

Before a former SAS member goes off on a paid mission, however, the drill requires that he get an informal OK—"a wink and a nod"—from a serving SAS officer.

Davidson, said to have been a man who always went by the book, told friends that he checked out the Togo operation with serving SAS officers, and was told as late in the game as Oct. 10: "The government has no view on this."

Since Togo is a far-off, French-controlled place of which little is known in Britain, it is conceivable that their one-time superiors gave the ex-SAS term the "wink and the nod." After all, the boys were getting $8,000 each as a down payment—with another $9,000 promised when the Eyadema job was done.

In any event, as late as Oct. 14—the day before the assassination was to take place—Finan evidently thought there was clear sailing. On that date, he sent a friend in London a postcard from Accra saying:

"Weather here is just excellent . . . Good business and some time to rest."

Little did he know that the British Foreign Office had already moved to abort his caper. Word of the planned coup had been picked up by agents of the Foreign Office's Secret Intelligence Service.

A warning to the Togolese president, Whitehall now says primly, was transmitted through "diplomatic channels" on Oct. 13, just two days before the Eyadem assassination was scheduled.

Foreign Office officials explain that London would have been horribly embarrassed by any link to an African coup at this delicate moment, when the United States and Britain are trying to win friends in black Africa—not eliminate presidents.

The Ministry of Defense says it knows of no meeting between Davidson and an SAS officer on Oct. 10 or any other date.

But the entire incident brings to the surface a battle that has been raging between the Foreign Office and the SAS over the mercenary question for more than a year.

The diplomats want a tough law passed that would prohibit the recruitment and use of mercenaries to any country ruled out-of-bounds by the British government.

The military, however, prefers the present law. It was enacted in 1870 and merely outlaws any mercenary traveling by ship. In a jet age, this makes all British mercenaries legal and keeps open the job market for SAS veterans.

If this explains the curious pattern of non-events in Togo, it still leaves unanswered who financed Finan. Who was behind the plot? Indeed, why anybody bothers about Togo puzzles observers here. The place has no oil or [illegible] but the [illegible] are nice nuts, but not very many and they are considered an exotic taste.

To be sure, Eyadema has enemies. Amnesty International has a list of 20 Togolese polical prisoners he is said to have had tortured to death last year, and this a regarded as just a sample.

Then there are the friends and relatives of Togo's first post-independence president, Sylvanus Olympio, who was personally shot to death Eyadema in 1963, a necessary step to Eyademas elevation to Togo's highest office four years later.

There also are the Ewes, a tribe that always nurses a sense of grievance. Their tribe was neatly divided in half by the post-World War I arrangement that gave Britain what is now Ghana and France what is now Togo. Diplomats here speak darkly of "irredentist" feeling on both sides of the border.

But none of these people are likely to have had the kind of cash Finan was flashing.

Inevitably in Africa, discussion turns to Libya's extremely rich and equally mercurial Col. Muammar Qaddafi. He is said to have made a $3 million gift to the Togolese people that wound up in the pockets of Eyademas ministers. Indeed, Finan's clean team in Britain was thought to have counted on help from disgruntled Togolese army officers, upset at the failure to share in the Libyan bounty.

One man, ex-Col. Finan, could clear up the whole mystery, it is said here, that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, who have troubles of their own these days, would like to question him.

But the impression given in Whitehall is that nobody wishes the Mounties much success. Finan's tale would embarrass a lot of people.

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, NOV 11 '71

Mercenaries Reportedly Involved

Britain Warned Togo of Plot To Slay President Eyadema

LONDON, Nov. 10 (AP).—Britain tipped off the African state of Togo about a plot by mercenaries to kill its president, Gnassingbe Eyadema, the Foreign Office confirmed yesterday.

A London newspaper had reported that British intelligence uncovered a plot to assassinate the head of the West African state last month.

The Evening Standard said that as a result of the tip "an international assassination squad of mercenaries, believed to include two Britons, are either dead or captives in Togo."

A Foreign Office spokesman refused to disclose what information the Foreign Office had about the mercenaries or the source of the information.

"We were aware early in October of rumors in Western mercenary circles," the spokesman said. "We heard rumors of a plot against Togo." He refused to elaborate on what he meant by Western mercenary circles.

'Diplomatic Channels'

Britain does not have a diplomatic mission in Lome, capital of the 21,000-square-mile country which has a population of about 2 million.

But the spokesman said that Britain passed on the information in its possession to Mr. Eyadema through "diplomatic channels."

The spokesman said that the Foreign Office did not know whether mercenaries in Togo had been arrested as reported by the Evening Standard.

A communiqué from a spokesman for the Togo government spoke of information about the plot coming from "vigilant friendly countries."

Togo has had much political violence since it gained independence from France in 1960.

Its first president, Sylvanus Olympio, was assassinated in 1963 and succeeded by his brother-in-law, Nicolas Grunitzky, the son of a Polish father and a Togolese mother.

Mr. Grunitzky was ousted in a coup in 1967 by Mr. Eyadema, an army general who has admitted he was the man who fired the shots that killed Mr. Olympio in the 1963 coup. Mr. Eyadema said when he assumed power that he was taking over "to put an end to the confused political situation." Togo's economy is based on phosphate mining, cocoa and smuggling.

Financial Times October 28 1977

Peace and quiet and cult of personality in Togo

By a Special Correspondent

PRESIDENT Gnassingbe Eyadema of [illegible] has taken a strong grip on [illegible] and turned his small West [illegible]rican State into a relative haven of peace and tranquillity during the ten years since he seized power. The bitter political infighting and regional rivalry that marked the country's early years of independence from France have largely quietened down.

There has been a strong drive for national unity, fostered by a deliberate personality cult built up around the President and by his formation in 1969 of a single political rallying point, the Togolese People's Rally (RPT), the sole political party.

Gen. Eyadema's is a ubiquitous presence in Togo, a State wedged between troubled Ghana, to the west, and turbulent Benin, to the east. His face peers from hillboards, his name is incessantly repeated on the State radio as he exhorts the peasants to greater efforts, or is effusively thanked for his service to the nation.

Massed troupes of political singers and dancers, in outfits emblazoned with his portrait, are present in every village and at international functions, chanting his praises.

The visitor to Togo may be struck by both an abundance of goods in Lome, the capital, and by the friendliness and general education of the Togolese, of whom 58 per cent. have had some form of schooling, according to 1975 figures.

Phosphates have given Togo a substantial base for economic expansion, but agriculture is not healthy. There may appear an atmosphere of political liberalism in the capital, but it tends to mask some real provincial problems. Repressive measures are apparently still applied, however quietly.

Gen. Eyadema assumed power in 1967, having engineered coups which unseated his two predecessors. The worst problem he inherited was the rivalry between the main ethnic groups in the North and South, which had been aggravated by a marked preference of the former colonial rulers for the South. Gen. Eyadema largely defused this by ensuring equal participation of both regions in national life and by favouring the North with investments. His creation of the RPT has undoubtedly contributed significantly to the unification of the two regions.

From a position of weakness, Gen. Eyadema has increased his power considerably. His favourite tactic, employed for the fourth time last November, is a threat to resign, invariably followed by well-rehearsed mass demonstrations demanding his reconsideration.

An active and moderate member of the Organisation of African Unity, Togo is a vigorous advocate of international cooperation, notably in the economic sphere. With a small population of only 2½m. and thus a small domestic market, it was at the forefront of efforts to create in 1975 the 16-State Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), which intends to eliminate quota and tariff barriers between members.

Togo's old border dispute with Ghana appears to be receding. The issue originates from the division of Togo, previously a German colony, into French and British administrative spheres after World War One. This carved the Ewe, the dominant tribe in the south of French Togoland, into two sections and led to vigorous protests from them. A UN plebiscite in British Togoland confirmed the integration of that territory into Ghana, against the opposition of the Ewe, who voted for integration with French Togoland.

Pressure, if any, for a border change now comes from a few Ghanaian Ewes. The Togolese themselves tend to write off their chances of regaining a territory which has long been under Ghanaian administration. Gen. Eyadema tacitly admitted as much when he officially visited the area in 1974.

Relations between Ghana and Togo emphasise the development of economic ties. Ghana supplies hydro-electric power from the Akosombo dam to Togo and Benin, while Ghana, the Ivory Coast and Togo have jointly undertaken the building of a major clinker works in Togo. Construction work has just started on the Frs.CFA65bn (£150m.) plant, which will produce 1.2m. tons of clinker a year and is designed to satisfy the cement needs of the three countries from 1979.

Phosphates, which accounted for 65 per cent. of export earnings in 1975 are of vital importance to Togo. One of Gen. Eyadema's most effective moves—at least politically—was his nationalisation of Africa's third largest phosphates producer, the Compagnie togolaise des mines du Benin (CTMB), in 1974. Increasingly dissatisfied with the level of revenues from taxes on the industry and from the minority state shareholding permitted under a pre-independence concession agreement, President Eyadema announced a 51 per cent Government participation in CTMB in January 1974.

Two weeks later, an aircraft flying him to the North crashed. Gen. Eyadema survived, accused CTMB of sabotage, and declared an immediate full nationalisation of the company. That year saw the first budget surplus since independence in 1960. The crash site has become the object of an annual national pilgrimage.

Staple food imports

Togo's agricultural sector is in a poor state. Over 80 per cent. of the population live in the countryside but they are far from exploiting all the cultivable land, necessitating substantial staple food imports. General Eyadema has optimistically pledged self-sufficiency within five years.

The current development plan assumed that phosphate revenues would remain unchanged from the unusually high prices achieved in 1974 and will probably require revision in view of the lower phosphates prices now ruling.

But while phosphate and the political stability under President Eyadema are [illegible] economic assets, long-term progress will depend considerably on the Government's ability to boost agricultural output.

National · Basic Intelligence Factbook, Jan. 1980

DECLASSIFIED

DEFENSE FORCES

Military manpower: males 15-49, 10,342,000; 6,337,000 fit for military service; about 517,000 reach military age (18) annually

Military budget: for fiscal year ending 30 September 1980, $995 million; 18.6% of central government budget

TOGO



See reference map VII

LAND

56,980 km²; nearly one-half is arable, under 15% cultivated

Land boundaries: 1,646 km

WATER

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): 30 nm (fishing 200 nm)

Coastline: 56 km

PEOPLE

Population: 2,564,000 (January 1980), average annual growth rate 2.8% (current)

Nationality: noun—Togolese (sing. & pl.); adjective—Togolese

Ethnic divisions: 37 tribes; largest and most important are Ewe in south and Cabrais in north; under 1% European and Syrian-Lebanese

Religion: about 20% Christian, 5% Muslim, 75% animist

Language: French, both official and language of commerce; major African languages are Ewe and Mina in the south and Dagomba and Kabie in the north

Literacy: 54.9% of school age (7-14) currently in school

Labor force: over 90% of population engaged in subsistence agriculture; about 30,000 wage earners, evenly divided between public and private sectors

Organized labor: 1 national union, the CNTT organized in 1972

GOVERNMENT

Legal name: Republic of Togo

Type: republic; under military rule since January 1967

Capital: Lome

Political subdivisions: 21 circumscriptions

Legal system: based on French civil law and customary practice; no constitution; has not accepted compulsory ICJ jurisdiction

National holiday: Independence Day, 27 April

Branches: military government, with civilian-dominated cabinet, took over on 14 April 1967, replacing provisional government created after January coup; no legislature; separate judiciary including State Security Court established 1970

Government leader: Gen. Gnassingbé Eyadéma, President, Minister of National Defense, and Armed Forces Chief of Staff

Suffrage: universal adult

Elections: presidential referendum of January 1972 elected Gen. Eyadéma for indefinite period

Political party: single party formed by President Eyadéma in September 1969, Rassemblement du Peuple Togolais, structure and staffing of p v closely controlled by government

Communists: no Communist Party; possibly some sympathizers

Member of: AFDB, CEAO (observer), EAMA, ECA, ECOWAS, ENTENTE, FAO, G-77, GATT, IBRD, ICAO, ICO, IDA, IFC, ILO, IMF, ITU, NAM, OAU, OCAM, U.N., UNESCO, UPU, WHO, WIPO, WMO, WTO

ECONOMY

GDP: $766.8 million (1978), about $310 per capita; estimated real growth 1970-77, 2.2%

Agriculture: main cash crops—coffee, cocoa, cotton; major food crops—yams, cassava, corn, beans, rice, millet, sorghum, fish; must import some foodstuffs

Major industries: phosphate mining, agricultural processing, handicrafts, textiles, beverages

Electric power: 30,000 kW capacity (1977); 110 million kWh produced (1977), 50 kWh per capita

Exports: $257.5 million (f.o.b. 1978); phosphates, cocoa, coffee, palm kernels, and cassava

Imports: $436.8 million (c.i.f., 1978); consumer goods, fuels, machinery, tobacco, foodstuffs

Major trade partners: mostly with France and other EC countries

Budget: (1978 proposed), revenues, $234.2 million; current expenditures, $152.8 million, capital expenditures $56.1

Monetary conversion rate: Communaute Financiere Africaine 225.6 francs=US$1 (1978)

Fiscal year: calendar year

DECLASSIFIED

COMMUNICATIONS

Railroads: 442 km meter gage (1.00 m), single track

Highways: 7,000 km total; 1,231 km paved, 1,282 km improved earth, 4,487 km unimproved earth

Inland waterways: section of Mono River and about 50 km of coastal lagoons and tidal creeks

Ports: 1 major (Lome), 1 minor

Civil air: 1 major transport aircraft

Airfields: 12 total, 12 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runway 2,440-3,659 m

Telecommunications: fair system based on skeletal network of open-wire lines supplemented by a radio relay route and radiocommunication stations; only center is Lome; 8,000 telephones (0.3 per 100 popl.); 2 AM stations, 1 FM radio station, 3 TV stations; 1 Atlantic Ocean satellite station

DEFENSE FORCES

Military manpower: males 15-49, 542,000; 282,000 fit for military service; no conscription

Military budget: for fiscal year ending 31 December 1979, $27.8 million; 9.8% of central government budget

TONGA



(See reference map VIII)

LAND

997 km² (169 islands, only 36 inhabited); 77% arable, 3% pasture, 13% forest, 3% inland water, 4% other

WATER

Limits of territorial waters (claimed): rectangular, polygonal claim (12 nm for Minerva Reef)

Coastline: 419 km (est.)

PEOPLE

Population: 92,000 (January 1980), average annual growth rate 0.3% (current)

Nationality: noun—Tongans); adjective—Tongan

Ethnic divisions: Polynesian, about 300 Europeans

Religion: Christian; Free Wesleyan Church claims over 30,000 adherents

Language: Tongan, English

Literacy: 90%-95%; compulsory education for children between ages of 6-14

Labor force: agriculture 10,303; mining 599

Organized labor: unorganized

GOVERNMENT

Legal name: Kingdom of Tonga

Type: constitutional monarchy

Capital: Nuku'alofa (located on Tongatapu Island)

Political subdivisions: 3 main island groups (Tongatapu, Ha'apai, Vava'u)

Legal system: based on English law

Branches: Executive (King and Privy Council); Legislative (Legislative Assembly composed of 7 nobles elected by their peers, 7 elected representatives of the people, 8 Ministers of the Crown; the King appoints one of the 7 nobles to be the speaker); Judiciary (Supreme Court, magistrate courts, Land Court)

Government leaders: King Taufa'ahau Tupou IV; Premier, Prince Fatafehi Tu'ipelehake (younger brother of the King)

Suffrage: granted to all literate adults over 21 years of age who pay taxes

Elections: held every 3 years, last in April 1978

Communists: none known

Member of: ADB, Commonwealth, South Pacific Forum, South Pacific Bureau for Economic Cooperation, Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific

ECONOMY

GNP: $39 million (1975), $400 per capita

Agriculture: largely dominated by coconut and banana production with subsistence crops of taro, yams, sweet potatoes, and bread fruit

Electric power: 4,000 kW capacity (1978); 8 million kWh produced (1978), 90 kWh per capita

Exports: $10 million (f.o.b., 1975); 65% copra, 7% coconut products, 8% bananas

Imports: $28 million (c.i.f., 1975); food, machinery, and petroleum

Major trade partners: (FY74) exports—95% Netherlands, 22% Australia, 20% New Zealand, 11% Norway; imports—63% New Zealand and Australia

Budget: (FY76) revenues $6.7 million, expenditures $8.3 million

Monetary conversion rate: 1 Tonga dollar=US$1.40 (1976)

Fiscal year: 1 July-30 June

COMMUNICATIONS

Railroads: none

Highways: 249 km total (1974); 177 km rolled stone; 72 km coral base

Ports: 2 minor

Civil air: no major transport aircraft